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The latest round of annual climate negotiations, held last November in Bonn, 
Germany, under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC),4  validated that the Paris Agreement5  (2015) has met one of two 
necessary conditions for ultimate success.  By achieving broad participation including 195 
countries accounting for 99% of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 6  the Paris 
Agreement dramatically improves upon the 14% of global emissions associated with 
countries acting under the Kyoto Protocol,7 the international agreement that it will replace 
in 2020. 
But the second necessary condition for ultimate success is adequate collective 
ambition of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) countries have individually 
pledged.  That condition has not yet been met.  As the negotiators in Bonn began the 
process of elaborating details of the Paris Agreement, a critical question remains how to 
incentivize countries to increase ambition over time.  
The ability to link different climate policies, such that emission reductions 
undertaken in one jurisdiction can be counted toward the mitigation commitments of 
another jurisdiction, may help Parties increase their ambition over time. In this essay, we 
explore options and challenges for facilitating such linkages in light of the considerable 
heterogeneity that is likely to characterize regional, national, and sub-national efforts to 
address climate change.  The three of us engaged in this topic in Bonn.  This article draws 
in part on our experience there. 
BACKGROUND.  Linkage is important, in part, because it can reduce the costs of 
achieving a given emissions-reduction objective.8 Lower costs, in turn, may contribute 
politically to embracing more ambitious objectives. In a world where the marginal cost of 
abatement ± that is, the cost to reduce an additional ton of emissions ± varies widely, 
linkage improves overall cost-effectiveness by allowing jurisdictions to finance reductions 
in other jurisdictions with relatively lower costs while allowing the former jurisdictions to 
count the emission reductions towards targets set in their NDCs. In effect, linkage drives 
participating jurisdictions toward a common cost of carbon, equalizing the marginal cost 
of abatement and producing a more efficient distribution of abatement activities. These 
benefits are potentially significant: a report by the World Bank estimated that international 
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linkage could reduce the cost of achieving the emissions reductions specified in the initial 
set of NDCs submitted under the Paris Agreement 32% by 2030 and 54% by 2050.9  
 In addition to lowering the costs of achieving emission-reduction targets, linkage 
can improve the functioning of individual markets:  by reducing market power by enlarging 
the scope of the market; and by reducing price volatility by thickening markets.  Beyond 
such direct economic benefits, significant political benefits exist.  As jurisdictions band 
together, linking can signal political momentum that contributes to more ambitious 
policies.  This can, as well, influence non-linking countries to join the fold and participate.  
Additionally, administrative economies of scale can be achieved through knowledge 
sharing in policy design and operation, as well as through shared administrative costs.  
Finally, and importantly, linkage can allow for the important UNFCCC equity principle of 
³FRPPRQ EXW GLIIHUHQWLDWHG UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV DQG UHVSHFWLYH FDSDELOLWLHV´ WR EH SXUVXHG
without sacrificing cost-effectiveness. 
 There are also legitimate concerns with linkage, including distributional impacts 
within and across jurisdictions, even though aggregate abatement costs are reduced.  
Because linking is inherently voluntary, however, it will generally not occur unless both 
parties to a link anticipate that overall benefits of the link ± including revenue from selling 
emission reductions ± will outweigh costs.  Likewise, individual exchanges made between 
compliance entities operating under a link are voluntary. 
Transferring pollution obligations can also raise concerns about environmental 
justice.  While greenhouse gases (GHGs) are a global pollutant, changes in GHG emissions 
can affect emissions of correlated local pollutants. This is a reasonable concern, but note 
that linkage could help reduce correlated local pollution in developing countries, because 
jurisdictions taking on increased mitigation obligations as a result of linkage, many of 
which will be low income developing countries, will see local pollution fall along with 
lower GHG emissions.  A more serious concern of linkage stems from the automatic 
propagation of some design elements from one system to another, including, in particular, 
cost-containment mechanisms in cap-and-trade systems ± banking, borrowing, and price 
collars.  This means there is decreased autonomy, as rules are set jointly by linked parties. 
 $OORIWKLVUHIHUVWRZKDWZHWKLQNRIDV³KDUGOLQNDJH´QDPHOy a formal recognition 
by a mitigation program in one jurisdiction of emission reductions undertaken in another 
MXULVGLFWLRQ IRU SXUSRVHV RI FRPSO\LQJ ZLWK WKH ILUVW MXULVGLFWLRQ¶V PLWLJDWLRQ SURJUDP
([DPSOHV RI VXFK ³KDUG OLQNDJH´ DUH WKH OLQNV EHWZHHQ the cap-and-trade systems in 
California and Québec, as well as, more recently, the European Union and Switzerland.  
%XWDQRWKHUSRVVLELOLW\ LV³VRIW OLQNDJH´E\ZKLFKZHPHDQDQDJUHHPHQW ± explicit or 
implicit ± to harmonize carbon prices either at a level or within overlapping bands.  This 
could happen with carbon taxes set at a specific rate (or within a target band), via cap-and-
trade systems with price collars, or through some mixture of the two. 
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A HOME FOR LINKAGE IN THE PARIS AGRFEEMENT.  Article 6.2 of the Paris 
Agreement provides a foundation for linkage by recognizing that Parties to the Agreement 
PD\ ³FKRRVH WR SXUVXH YROXQWDU\ FRRSHUDWLRQ LQ WKH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI WKHLU´ NDCs 
through ³WKHXVHRILQWHUQDWLRQDOO\WUDQVIHUUHGPLWLJDWLRQRXWFRPHV´ (ITMOs).10 In contrast 
to the Kyoto Protocol (which likewise included provisions for international cooperation), 
the voluntary and flexible architecture of the Paris Agreement allows for wide variation, 
not only in the types of climate policies countries choose to implement, but also in the form 
and stringency of the abatement targets they adopt.  
To be clear, there are three conceptually ± and operationally ± distinct aspects of 
international policy linkage:  (1) provisions in Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement and 
related guidance that can facilitate international linkage, by providing ± for example ± for 
,702V WR EH XVHG DV DQ DFFRXQWLQJ PHFKDQLVP ZKHQ ³FRPSOLDQFH´ ZLWK 1'&V LV
measured; (2) agreements between two jurisdiction (Parties to the Paris Agreement or 
possibly sub-national jurisdictions) to recognize emission reductions generated in the other 
jurisdiction; and (3) two compliance entities, one in each of the linked jurisdictions, engage 
in an exchange, such as with allowances moving between two cap-and-trade systems. 
HETEROGENEOUS LINKAGE.  Linkage is relatively straightforward when the 
policies involved are similar. However, linkage is possible even when this is not the case: 
for example, when one jurisdiction is using a cap-and-trade system to reduce emissions 
while another jurisdiction is relying on carbon taxes or performance standards. More 
broadly, there are several potential sources of heterogeneity: type of policy instrument (for 
example, taxes vs. cap-and-trade vs. performance or technology standard); level of 
government jurisdiction involved (for example, regional, national, or sub-national); status 
under the Paris Agreement (that is, whether or not the jurisdiction is a Party to the 
Agreement ± or within a Party); nature of the policy target (for example, absolute mass-
based emissions vs. emissions intensity vs. change relative to business-as-usual); and 
operational details of the FRXQWU\¶V1'&, including type of mitigation target, choice of 
target and reference years, and sectors and greenhouse gases covered.  
ANALYZING POTENTIAL LINKAGES.  Most forms of heterogeneity ± including 
with respect to policy instruments, jurisdictions, and targets ± do not present 
insurmountable obstacles to linkage.  In principle, the most straightforward case of 
international climate policy linkage would be a pair of national cap-and-trade systems in 
Parties to the Paris Agreement with each utilizing an absolute (mass-based) target in its 
NDC.  A real-world example of this case could be a link between the cap-and-trade systems 
in New Zealand and Switzerland.   
A less obvious case would be a pair of sub-national policies ± one a carbon tax and one a 
cap-and-trade system.  An example here would be a link between the carbon tax in British 
Columbia and the cap-and-trade system in Tokyo.  Yet another case of heterogeneous 
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OLQNDJH PLJKW EH EHWZHHQ WKH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ¶V (PLVVLRQV 7UDGLQJ 6\VWHP DQG
&DOLIRUQLD¶VFDS-and-trade program.  All of these would be conceptually feasible and merit 
consideration, although each raises issues that require attention and call for specific 
accounting guidance if linkage is to include the use of ITMOs under the Paris Agreement. 
ISSUES FOR CLIMATE NEGOTIATORS.  Parties are currently working to elaborate 
guidance on Article 6.2, but have expressed widely differing views on what issues to 
include in such guidance. 11   During the latest discussions in Bonn, Parties signaled 
agreement on the need to offer at least minimal guidance on how to account for transfers 
of ITMOs. Beyond that, however, positions diverge on whether to address broader 
questions that bear on linkage under Article 6.2. Particular divisions center around issues 
of environmental integrity, governance, and the contribution of ITMO transfers to 
sustainable development.  
From our analysis, it appears important that guidance on Article 6.2 set out a robust 
accounting framework to prevent double-counting of GHG reductions, to ensure that the 
timing (vintage) of claimed reductions and of respective ITMO transfers is correctly 
accounted for, and to ensure that participating countries make appropriate adjustments for 
emissions or reductions covered by their NDCs when using ITMOs.  In other work, we 
offer specific approaches for ITMO accounting under Article 6.2.12  Additional issues that 
would benefit from guidance include how to quantify ITMOs and how to account for 
heterogeneous base years, different vintages of targets and outcomes, and transfers between 
Parties and non-Parties to the Paris Agreement. 
Given their limited negotiating mandate, however, Parties should exercise caution when 
developing guidance under Article 6.2 that goes beyond accounting issues. Onerous 
conditions related to the ambition or integrity of domestic action, for instance, could deter 
linkage. This does not mean that such concerns should be neglected; but they are best 
addressed under the corresponding negotiating tracks, such as the Talanoa Dialogue to take 
stock of the collective efforts of Parties, or the enhanced transparency framework under 
Article 13 of the Paris Agreement. 
A PATH FORWARD. Clear and consistent guidance for accounting of emissions 
transfers under Article 6.2 can contribute to greater certainty and predictability for Parties 
engaged in voluntary cooperation, thereby facilitating expanded use of linkage. Too much 
guidance, however, particularly if it includes restrictive quality or ambition requirements, 
might impede linkage and dampen incentives for cooperation.  
A combination of common accounting rules and an absence of restrictive criteria 
and conditions may accelerate linkage and allow for broader and deeper policy cooperation, 
which in turn can increase the potential for Parties to scale up the ambition of their NDCs. 
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And that may ultimately foster stronger engagement between Parties (and non-Parties), as 
well as with regional and sub-national jurisdictions. 
The Parties to the Paris Agreement will continue their negotiations in Bonn this 
May, as they seek to make progress toward agreeing to a finalized rulebook for Article 6 
at the December 2018 annual climate summit, to be held in Katowice, Poland.  The 
decisions the negotiators reach this year could greatly advance or ± conversely ± impede 
international climate policy linkage, and thereby play a key role in determining the ultimate 
fate of the Paris Agreement. 
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